Ever since discovering the culture war, journalists have honed in on its political impact. Debates on gender, reproduction, health and medicine, or science and education all come down to the same “so what” question: What's the effect on candidates, voting blocs, and exit polls?
Whether or not you buy the culture war narrative is one issue. Admittedly, there's a lot of good research suggesting no such thing exists—or at least not in the way the press reports on it. But don't tell that to news editors and political operatives, both of whom have vested interests in keeping the conflict fresh.
Above and beyond the reality of the culture war frame is the question of analysis. For argument's sake, let's say there are stark differences in how Americans see the world and, in particular, issues of religion, culture and morality. Can those differences be fully understood in terms of politics? More to the point, can they be comprehended by the media's narrow definition of politics as horse race, sports event, or zero-sum game?
Two new books suggest that we've overlooked sex and class. Better make that sex, class and the intersection of sex and class. In Sex in Crisis: The New Sexual Revolution and the Future of American Politics, Dagmar Herzog takes a close look at how the religious right's teachings about sexuality have affected American attitudes toward sex and gender. Herzog argues that the religious right made sex more fun for true believers, while working through political channels to repress the rights and activities of most everyone else.
“My biggest goals were to communicate just how malicious (and by no means moral) the religious right's effects have been,” Herzog told Religion Dispatches. “to show how people's deepest longings and fears around sex and love can so easily be manipulated, to remind Americans how rapid the onslaught has been and how recently we actually had a great deal more self-confidence in defending our sexual privacy and rights.”
The Religious Right's pro-sex stance ensured its success with Christians and from that base, it secularized an anti-sex message to reach a broader audience. Says Herzog: “Repression has now been repackaged as promotion of mental well-being. Suddenly everything is about low self-esteem: homosexuality, abortions, pornography, pre-marital sex.”
Bethany Moreton's To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise is equally smart about gender and politics, but her analysis ties in the economy. Moreton describes how female employees and consumers imbued Wal-Mart with a Christian populist sensibility that helped account for its rapid success. Women employees brought the domestic model of male headship to the workplace, and taught their bosses to be “servant-leaders.” Customers, responsive to the stores' culture of family values and homespun thrift, could shop with confidence: they weren't conspicuous consumers, they were good Christians.
Reporters got a glimpse of this potent mix when Wal-Mart Moms emerged as swing voters in the 2008 election. The swirling mix of gender, politics and economics had served George W. Bush in 2004 but seemed cool to McCain. Although stories tried to catch the motivating passions that could compel these women's votes, most reduced it to buying power. Moreton extends it further: “faith in God and faith in the market grew in tandem, aided by a generous government and an organized, corporate-funded grassroots movement for Christian free enterprise.” In other words, these women were looking for a savvy pol who saw, as they did, a link between religion, government and the market.
The past 35 years have seen remarkable changes in American politics that can't be captured by handicapping candidates or even issues. The lodestar of “family values” –increasingly central to discussions of gender, free enterprise and even international relations—needs examination. Moreton and Herzog have initiated the discussion, now the rest of us need to follow.
Diane Winston